Extractors and Secret Sharing Against Bounded Collusion Protocols

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Abstract—In a recent work, Kumar, Meka, and Sahai (FOCS 2019) introduced the notion of bounded collusion protocols (BCPs). BCPs are multiparty communication protocols in which \( N \) parties, holding \( n \) bits each, attempt to compute some joint function of their inputs, \( f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\} \). In each round, \( p \) parties (the collusion bound) work together to write a single bit on a public blackboard, and the protocol continues until every party knows the value of \( f \).

BCPs are a natural generalization of the well-studied number-in-hand (NIH) and number-on-forehead (NOF) models, which are just endpoints on this rich spectrum of protocols (corresponding to \( p = 1 \) and \( p = N - 1 \), respectively). In this work, we investigate BCPs more thoroughly, and answer questions about them in the context of communication complexity, randomness extractors, and secret sharing.

1. First, we provide explicit lower bounds against BCPs. Our lower bounds offer a tradeoff between collusion and complexity, and \( n \) is of the form \( n^{\Omega(1)} \) when \( p = 0.99N \) parties collude. This bound is independent of the relationship between \( N, n \), whereas all previous bounds became trivial when \( N > 1.1 \log n \).

2. Second, we provide explicit leakage-resilient extractors against BCPs. Also known as cylinder-intersection extractors, these objects are multi-source extractors of the form \( \operatorname{Ext} : \{0,1\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\} \), whose output looks uniform even conditioned on the bits produced ("leaked") by a BCP executed over the inputs of the extractor. Our extractors work for sources with min-entropy \( k \geq \text{polylog}(n) \) against BCPs with collusion \( p \leq N - 2 \). Previously, all such extractors required min-entropy \( k \geq 0.99n \) even when \( p \leq O(1) \).

3. Third, we provide efficient leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes against BCPs. These cryptographic primitives are standard \( t \)-out-of-\( N \) secret sharing schemes, equipped with an additional guarantee that the secret remains hidden even if the individuals participate in a BCP using their shares. Our schemes can handle collusion up to \( p \leq O(t/\log t) \), whereas the previous best scheme required \( p \leq O(\log N) \).

Along the way, we also construct objects that are more general than those listed above (i.e., compilers), objects that are more specialized (and stronger) than those listed above, and resolve open questions posed by Goyal and Kumar (STOC 2018) and Kumar, Meka, and Sahai (FOCS 2019).

Keywords—bounded collusion protocols; multiparty communication complexity; randomness extractors; secret sharing; leakage-resilience; lower bounds

I. INTRODUCTION

We begin by motivating our questions through the three main focus areas of this work: communication complexity, randomness extractors, and secret sharing.

Multiparty communication complexity: In a seminal work, Yao [1] initiated the study of communication complexity, where one seeks to understand how much communication is needed to compute a function \( f \) when its input is split between two parties. Since its introduction, communication complexity has blossomed into a central area of complexity theory, with connections to many other fields (see, e.g., the excellent book [2]).

Here, we focus on the multiparty setting - where the input is split amongst more than two parties. Perhaps the most natural way to define the multiparty communication complexity of a function \( f \) would be via number-in-hand (NIH) protocols ([3]–[5]). In this model, the input is split evenly across the participating parties, and each party can see only the input provided to them. The parties may communicate by writing on a public blackboard, and the protocol continues until every party knows the value of \( f \). The NIH multiparty communication complexity of \( f \), denoted \( \text{CC}^{\text{NIH}}(f) \), is then defined as the number of bits that must be communicated by any such protocol (in the worst case over all inputs).

In 1983, Chandra, Furst, and Lipton [6] introduced an alternative way to define multiparty communication complexity via so-called number-on-forehead (NOF) protocols. Here, the input is once again split evenly across the participating parties, but each party is now able to see all inputs except their own (which, metaphorically, is written on their forehead). The parties still communicate via a public blackboard, and the NOF multiparty communication complexity of \( f \), denoted \( \text{CC}^{\text{NOF}}(f) \), is defined analogously to \( \text{CC}^{\text{NIH}}(f) \). Because each party can see much more of the input in NOF protocols than in NIH protocols, NOF protocols are much more powerful and hence \( \text{CC}^{\text{NOF}}(f) \leq \text{CC}^{\text{NIH}}(f) \).

It turns out that multiparty communication protocols offer an attractive model in which to pursue lower bounds, for two
reasons. First, these protocols appear to be simple enough to reason about combinatorially: if we write down a boolean function \( f : \{(0,1)^n\}^N \rightarrow \{-1,1\} \) in the cells of a multi-dimensional matrix \( M_f \), one can get lower bounds on \( \text{CC}^{\text{NOF}}(f) \) and \( \text{CC}^{\text{NOF}}(f) \) by upper bounding the discrepancy of certain well-structured subsets of \( M_f \). Second, these protocols appear to be rich enough to capture seemingly unrelated models of computation: NIH lower bounds imply (memory) lower bounds against streaming algorithms [7], while NOF lower bounds imply lower bounds in proof complexity [8] and circuit complexity [9]–[13] (for more connections, see the excellent survey [14]). Finally, as we will see, lower bounds against these protocols find great applicability in settings where hardness is considered “good” (like cryptography) [15].

Given these beautiful connections, it is natural to wonder whether NIH and NOF protocols can be placed into a more general framework of protocols, whose exploration could offer further insight into the above applications and lower bounds. In a recent work [15], Kumar, Meka, and Sahai introduced exactly such a family of communication protocols, called bounded collusion protocols (BCPs). Like the protocols we’ve seen before, BCPs are defined with respect to \( N \) parties, holding \( n \) bits of input each, who wish to compute a function \( f : \{(0,1)^n\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) while communicating via a public blackboard. Unlike the protocols we’ve seen before, BCPs consider an additional parameter \( p \) (the collusion bound): in every round of the BCP, \( p \) parties may get together to write a bit on the blackboard, using all of the input in their possession.

BCPs define a natural spectrum of communication protocols, which is induced by the collusion bound \( p \) and gets more powerful as \( p \) increases. Furthermore, it is easy to see that NIH and NOF protocols are just endpoints on this spectrum (at \( p = 1 \) and \( p = N - 1 \), respectively). Thus, if we define \( \text{CC}^p(f) \) as the communication complexity of the function \( f : \{(0,1)^n\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) with respect to BCPs with collusion bound \( p \), we have:

\[
\text{CC}^{\text{NOF}}(f) = \text{CC}^{N-1}(f) \leq \text{CC}^{N-2}(f) \leq \ldots \leq \text{CC}^2(f) \leq \text{CC}^1(f) = \text{CC}^{\text{NIH}}(f).
\]

It is relatively straightforward to come up with an explicit function \( f : \{(0,1)^n\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) such that \( \text{CC}^{\text{NIH}}(f) \geq n \) (see, for example, the books [14], [16]), whereas getting strong explicit lower bounds against NOF protocols is much more difficult: the best known results [17], [18] are of the form \( \text{CC}^{\text{NOF}}(f) \geq \Omega(n/2^N) \). It is natural to wonder how explicit lower bounds against BCPs (and the difficulty of proving them) evolve from the NIH side of the spectrum to the NOF side of the spectrum. This leads us to our first question:

**Question 1.** Can we provide explicit lower bounds that exhibit a collusion-complexity tradeoff against the spectrum of BCPs?

In particular, it would be especially interesting to understand when we can obtain nontrivial explicit lower bounds in the setting \( N \gg \log n \). No such bounds are known for NOF protocols, and in fact overcoming this “logarithmic barrier” is a longstanding challenge in complexity theory. Indeed, it has been shown that any significant improvements to the best NOF lower bounds would yield a breakthrough in circuit complexity, by providing new lower bounds against the circuit class \( \text{ACC}^0 \) [10], [12], [13]. Our first main result (Theorem 1) will answer the above questions, and in fact show that upon slightly reducing the collusion bound from \( p = N - 1 \) (NOF) to \( p = 0.99N \), we can obtain explicit lower bounds of the form \( \text{CC}^p(f) \geq n^{\Omega(1)} \), regardless of the dependence between \( N, n \).

**Leakage-resilient extractors:** The second main question that we consider will ask whether we can strengthen the above explicit worst-case lower bounds to something even stronger: average-case bounds (or, equivalently, correlation bounds). In particular, we would like to explore whether it is possible to explicitly construct a function \( f \) such that every BCP requires a large amount of communication to compute \( f \) even on just slightly more than half of all possible inputs.\(^2\) We will in fact consider an even more challenging goal: obtaining such correlation bounds under non-uniform distributions on the input. In order to better understand and motivate our question, we will venture into the world of randomness extractors.

Extractors are fundamental objects in pseudorandomness, motivated by the observation that most applications of randomness in computer science require access to uniform random bits, yet the bits that we are able to harvest from nature are often biased and correlated. Extractors are algorithms that purify biased samples of randomness into samples that look uniform, thus offering a solution to the above problem. More formally, an extractor \( \text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) is a single deterministic function, defined with respect to some error \( \epsilon \) and family of distributions \( \mathcal{X} \) over \( \{0,1\}^n \). It offers the guarantee that for any source \( X \in \mathcal{X} \),

\[
|\text{Ext}(X) - U_m| \leq \epsilon,
\]

where \( U_m \) is the uniform distribution over \( \{0,1\}^m \), and \( |\cdot| \) represents the standard statistical distance. Since their introduction, extractors have found beautiful applications in cryptography, coding theory, derandomization, and combinatorics. We refer the reader to [19], [20] for an excellent introduction to the area.

\(^1\)Here and throughout, \( N \) and \( n \) are distinct parameters.

\(^2\)Note that there is always a trivial BCP that computes \( f \) on at least half of all possible inputs: the BCP that always outputs 0, or the BCP that always outputs 1.
One of the most well-studied models of randomness extraction is the setting where each $X \in X$ consists of $N$ independent sources [21]–[25]. Here, the general extractor definition above specializes to give a so-called extractor for independent sources $\text{Ext} : (\{0,1\}^n)^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ which guarantees that, given as input $N$ independent sources over $\{0,1\}^n$, each with min-entropy at least $k$, it will output $m$ bits that are close to uniform.\footnote{The min-entropy of a source $X$ over $\{0,1\}^n$ is at least $k$ if and only if $\Pr[X = x] \leq 2^{-k}$, for all $x \in \text{support}(X)$.} Recently, Kumar, Meka, and Sahai introduced a much stronger variant of extractors for independent sources, known as cylinder-intersection extractors [15].

A cylinder-intersection extractor is a multi-source extractor that offers an additional guarantee that its output will look uniform even conditioned on the output of a BCP executed on the inputs to Ext. More formally, we define the class $\text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ to consist of all functions $g : (\{0,1\}^n)^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu$ representing the bits written on the public blackboard by some BCP (its transcript), with collusion bound $p$, executed over $N$ parties holding $n$ bits each. Then, a cylinder-intersection extractor $\text{Ext}$ against $\text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ guarantees that, for any $N$ independent sources $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N)$, each with min-entropy at least $k$, and any BCP transcript $g \in \text{BCP}(p, \mu)$,

$$\left|\left(\text{Ext}(X), g(X)\right) - (U_m, g(X))\right| \leq \epsilon,$$

where $U_m$ is independent of $g(X)$. Thus, cylinder-intersection extractors are classical independent source extractors, equipped with an additional guarantee of being leakage-resilient against BCPs. As such, we will also refer to these objects as leakage-resilient extractors (LREs) against BCPs.

Beyond being interesting objects in their own right, there are several reasons to study such leakage-resilient extractors. First, one can observe that such extractors for min-entropy $k = n$, which output $m = 1$ bit, are actually functions with high average-case communication complexity (also known as distributional communication complexity) against BCPs. Thus, as noted in [15], asking if we can construct even stronger objects that work for $k \ll n$ is a natural way to translate our original question from communication complexity into the land of extractors. Furthermore, in very recent subsequent work, it was shown that LREs against BCPs can be used to create much improved extractors for more classical settings [26], and it is also not difficult to imagine settings in cryptography where such objects can come in handy (see the full version of this paper).

All of this motivates our second main question:

**Question 2.** Can we construct leakage-resilient extractors against BCPs for min-entropy $k \ll n$?

Our second main result(s) (Theorems 2 and 3) answer this question positively, and shows that we can construct such objects even when $k = \text{polylog}(n)$. Furthermore, the tradeoff we obtain between allowed leakage $\mu$ and collusion bound $p$ almost exactly matches the complexity-collusion tradeoff in our answer to Question 1.

**Leakage-resilient secret sharing:** The third main question that we consider revisits the original motivating application considered by Kumar, Meka, and Sahai [15] in their introduction of BCPs: leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes. Secret sharing schemes were introduced in the seminal works of Blakley [27] and Shamir [28] and have since become a classical cryptographic primitive. These schemes capture the natural setting of a central authority who wishes to share some secret (e.g., missile launch codes) among a group of $N$ somewhat trusted individuals. Each individual is to receive a portion (or share) of the secret, so that any $t$ of them may reconstruct the secret, but any fewer than $t$ of them cannot recover any information. Formally, these schemes are known as $t$-out-of-$N$ schemes.

Kumar, Meka, and Sahai study a much stronger variant of secret sharing, known as leakage-resilient secret sharing (LRSS). In addition to the above thresholding guarantees, an LRSS scheme guarantees that the secret will remain statistically hidden even against much stronger adversaries. The adversaries they consider are exactly the family of bounded collusion protocols $\text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ (defined above) acting over the $N$ individuals participating in the scheme.\footnote{As a sanity check, it is useful to observe that a $t$-out-of-$N$ secret-sharing scheme can only be equipped with leakage-resilience against BCP $\text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ when $p < t$.} It turns out that BCPs are an especially natural class against which one may want to ensure leakage-resilience of a secret sharing scheme: not only do BCPs generalize and strengthen several previous models of leakage (from non-adaptive, disjoint settings to an adaptive, joint setting), but their definition also allows one to leverage tools from communication complexity to construct such LRSS schemes.

Indeed, in [15] the authors show that by using a function with high (distributional) communication complexity against NOF protocols, it is possible to construct LRSS schemes against NOF protocols. However, there is a catch: because the best known NOF lower bounds are quite weak (recall from earlier that they are of the form $\Omega(n/2^N)$), it turns out that in order to make the schemes leakage-resilient, each individual must be provided with a secret share of size $\gg 2^N$. Because efficiency in secret sharing is classified by share size growing polynomially in the number of participants, $N$, a new idea is needed.

Using an idea of reusing shares with perfect hash families, combined with NOF lower bounds, Kumar, Meka, and Sahai are able to circumvent this issue, at least for BCPs, and construct LRSS schemes. However, while they successfully remove the exponential dependence of share size on $N$, they incur an exponential dependence of share size on $p$. As such, they are only able to ensure leakage-resilience against BCPs...
with collusion \( p = O(\log N) \). This is again an artifact of the weak \( \Omega(n/2^N) \) NOF lower bounds, which they use as a black box in their construction. Indeed, as observed in [15], efficient secret sharing schemes for \( t = p + 1 \) with \( p = \omega(\log N) \) would resolve longstanding bottlenecks in complexity theory. However, it is not unreasonable to think that if we have stronger lower bounds against BCPs (which do not follow from applying NOF bounds in a black box manner), we may be able to avoid this barrier for \( t \gg p \). Luckily, as described in the previous two sections, we are able to obtain explicit bounds of exactly this nature. This motivates our third and final question:

**Question 3.** Can we use our new explicit lower bounds against BCPs to construct efficient LRSS schemes against BCPs with collusion \( p = \omega(\log N) \)?

As we will see, our third main result (Theorem 4) answers this question in the affirmative, and shows that we can construct such leakage-resilient \( t \)-out-of-\( N \) schemes for collusion \( p \leq O(t/\log t) \). For the special case of \( N \)-out-of-\( N \) schemes, we can handle \( p \) up to \( 0.99N \).

We now proceed to formally state our main theorems.

### A. Summary of Our Results

In our first main theorem, we establish explicit lower bounds against the spectrum of BCPs. These bounds exhibit a collusion-complexity tradeoff, answering Question 1.

**Theorem 1.** For all \( N, n \in \mathbb{N} \) and \( p \leq N - 1 \), there exists an explicit function \( f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) with

\[
\text{CC}^p(f) \geq \Omega\left(\frac{\log(N/p)}{n/\log(N/p) + \epsilon} \right).
\]

In particular, Theorem 1 provides an explicit function \( f \) such that for BCPs with \( p = 0.99N \) collusion, \( \text{CC}^p(f) \geq n/\Omega(1) \). Previously, the best known result [15] followed immediately from lower bounds against NOF protocols [17], and was of the form \( \text{CC}^p(f) \geq \Omega(n/2^p) \). Thus, all previous bounds against \( p = 0.99N \) collusion became trivial when \( N > 1.1 \log n \).

Next, we show that we can significantly strengthen our explicit lower bounds to average-case lower bounds, and in fact strengthen these even further to produce leakage-resilient extractors against BCPs for polylogarithmic entropy (such extractors, even for full entropy, give explicit average-case lower bounds against BCPs). Furthermore, we achieve a collusion-leakage tradeoff that mirrors the collusion-complexity tradeoff from the previous result. We record our second main theorem, which answers Question 2 and a question of Kumar, Meka, and Sahai [15], below.

**Theorem 2.** For all \( N, n, k \in \mathbb{N} \) satisfying \( N \geq 3 \) and \( k \geq \operatorname{polylog} n \), and any \( p \leq N - 2 \), there exists an explicit leakage-resilient extractor \( \operatorname{Ext} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) against BCP\((p, \mu)\) for min-entropy \( k \), with output length \( m = \mu \) and error \( \epsilon = 2^{-\mu} \), where

\[
\mu = k^{\Omega(\log(N/p))}.
\]

In particular, Theorem 2 provides an explicit extractor for \( k \geq \operatorname{polylog}(n) \) entropy that can handle \( k^{\Omega(1)} \) leakage from BCPs with \( p = 0.99N \) collusion. Previously, the best known result [15] followed immediately from lower bounds against NOF protocols [17], and required min-entropy \( k \geq 0.99n \) even for \( p \leq O(1) \) collusion. In addition to our explicit extractor, we also provide a much more general object: an explicit **compiler** that can transform any function with NOF lower bounds into a leakage-resilient extractor against BCPs. As NOF lower bounds are strengthened over time, our compiler is guaranteed to produce improved extractors. Finally, we remark that Theorem 2 can handle up to \( p = N - 2 \) collusion. In the extreme setting of \( p = N - 1 \) collusion (i.e., NOF leakage), we can construct the following extractor.

**Theorem 3.** For all \( N > 5 \), sufficiently large \( n \in \mathbb{N} \), there exists an explicit leakage-resilient extractor \( \operatorname{Ext} : \{0,1\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\} \) against BCP\((N-1, \mu)\) for min-entropy \( 0.3n \), with error \( \epsilon = 2^{-\Omega(\mu)} \) and \( \mu = \Omega(n)/2^N \).

In our final main theorem, we combine our explicit (average-case) lower bounds with new ideas to construct much improved \( t \)-out-of-\( N \) secret sharing schemes that are leakage-resilient against BCPs, answering Question 3.

**Theorem 4.** For all \( N \geq t \geq 2 \), there exists an efficient \( t \)-out-of-\( N \) secret sharing scheme (Share, Rec) that is leakage-resilient against BCP\((p, \mu)\), provided \( p \leq O(t/\log t) \).

As a crucial step towards this, we design efficient \( N \)-out-of-\( N \) schemes that can handle collusion up to \( p = 0.99N \). Previously, all efficient secret sharing schemes could only handle \( p = O(\log N) \) collusion [15]. In addition to these schemes, we also provide a much more general object: an explicit **compiler** that can transform any given secret sharing scheme having authorized sets of size at least \( t \) into a scheme that is leakage-resilient against BCPs with collusion \( p \leq O(t/\log t) \). Thus, we can also obtain leakage-resilient schemes for access structures like monotone span programs, monotoneNP, and monotoneNP, by instantiating our compiler with previous schemes ([29]–[31]). Finally, in the special case of BCPs that act over disjoint subsets of individuals, our \( t \)-out-of-\( N \) schemes can handle collusion \( p = t - 1 \) (which is optimal), resolving a question of Goyal and Kumar [32].

3 We note that our function in Theorem 1 can also achieve this bound, which is slightly better when, e.g., \( p = O(1) \).

4 For \( N = 3 \) (resp. 4, 5), we achieve min-entropy rate 0.4 (resp. 0.33)

5 Sharing and reconstruction function run in time \( \poly(N, m, \mu, \log(1/\epsilon)) \) for \( m \) bit secrets.
B. Relevant Prior Work

**Bounded collusion protocols:** BCPs were introduced by Kumar, Meka, and Sahai in [15]. There, the authors provided preliminary explicit lower bounds against BCPs (as discussed in the previous section), but primarily focused on the application of BCPs to secret sharing. Given their very recent introduction, no other work has been done on BCPs - we hope, however, they will become a fruitful object of study.

**Extractors:** Generalizing the work of Santha and Vazirani [33] and Vazirani [34], Chor and Goldreich [21] initiated the study of extractors for independent sources in 1988. Since then, a beautiful line of work [22]–[25] has provided explicit constructions of these objects with near-optimal parameters. Recently, several works have emerged that study randomness extractors for “slightly dependent” sources [35]–[37]. In the current paper, we study cylinder-intersection extractors (which we also call leakage-resilient extractors against BCPs). These may indeed be viewed as extractors for “slightly dependent” sources, but the dependence model here is very different from the aforementioned works. Cylinder-intersection extractors were introduced by Kumar, Meka, and Sahai [15].

**Secret Sharing:** Secret sharing schemes were introduced in the seminal works of Blakley [27] and Shamir [28]. These schemes, while originally envisioned with only the goal of t-out-of-N secrecy, have since been strengthened in various ways (see survey [30]). In the current paper, we focus on equipping secret sharing schemes with leakage-resilience, which has a long history in cryptography (see, e.g., the survey of Kalai and Reyzin [38]). In the context of secret sharing, leakage-resilience has recently garnered significant interest: [15], [32], [39]–[46]. We refer the reader to [15], [45] for a more detailed overview. The only other works with some form of joint-leakage are Srinivasan and Vasudevan [44] and Lin et al. [45]. Lin et al. consider a non-compartmentalized model where the leakage can be a linear function of all the shares. [44] designed t-out-of-n LRSS against an adversary who learns any set of t – 2 shares and then uses these fixed t – 2 shares to non-adaptively learn information from each of the other n – t + 2 shares independently.

C. Open Problems

**Improved cylinder-intersection extractors for NOF leakage:** In the current paper, we construct leakage-resilient extractors against BCPs with collusion p ≤ N – 2, which work for k ≥ polylog(n) entropy. In the NOF case (p = N – 1), however, our extractors require k ≥ 0.3n entropy. It would be very nice to reduce the entropy requirement in this more difficult case, even just to k ≥ o(n), as we imagine this will require significantly new techniques.

Lifting theorems for the NOF model: Two-source extractors have been useful for obtaining query-to-communication lifting theorems for the case of two parties [47]. It is an interesting research direction to use our new cylinder-intersection extractors to obtain lifting theorems for the multiparty case.

**Reduce the gap between p and t for LRSS:** In the current paper, we designed efficient t-out-of-N secret sharing schemes for collusion up to p ≤ O(t/\log t). But it may still be possible to reach p = 0.99t for all t < N matching our results for the special case of t = N. It would be interesting to reduce this gap - perhaps by designing schemes that do not rely on ramp hash families, as this gap originates from barriers that come from such families.

**Leakage-resilient multiparty computation (MPC):** It would be interesting to try to design multi-party leakage-resilient MPC protocols as a possible application of our LRSS schemes. Prior work of Goyal et al. [48] designs such protocols only for the two party case, and leaves open the design for higher number of parties.

D. Organization

In Section II, we provide an overview of the techniques we use to prove our main results. Next, in Section III, we discuss some basic preliminaries, and include formal definitions for several key notions that were discussed informally in Section I. Next, in Section IV, we construct explicit lower bounds and leakage-resilient extractors against BCPs, proving Theorems 1 and 2. Finally, in Section V, we explicitly construct a leakage-resilient extractor against NOF leakage, proving Theorem 3. The proof to Theorem 4, and the remarks sprinkled throughout Section I-A, can be found in the full version of the paper.

This paper is a merge of the works [49], [50]. Together, these should be referenced as the full version of the paper.

II. OVERVIEW OF TECHNIQUES

In what follows, we provide a high level overview of the techniques we use to prove our main results (cf. Section I-A).

A. Explicit lower bounds against BCPs

We start by outlining the proof of our explicit lower bounds against BCPs (Theorem 1). We recall that a function hard : \{0, 1\}^\mu N \rightarrow \{0, 1\} has complexity CC^\mu(\text{hard}) > \mu if, for any BCP protocol g ∈ BCP(p, \mu) and uniform random variable X ∼ \{0, 1\}^\mu N, it holds that hard(X) becomes a constant with probability less than 1 upon fixing g(X) (see Remark 1). Thus, we aim to explicitly construct such a function hard with \mu matching the parameters in Theorem 1. We will show that, in fact, it suffices to simply take hard to be an explicit function that exhibits the best known lower bounds against NOF protocols.

We will take hard to be the finite field multiplication function FFM_N : \{0, 1\}^\mu N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}. On input (x_1, \ldots, x_N),
this function interprets these strings as elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, takes their product over this field, interprets this result again as a boolean string, and outputs the first bit. Using discrepancy arguments over objects known as Hadamard tensors, Ford and Gål show [18] that this extremely simple function has NOF complexity $CC_{NOF}^N (FFM_N) \geq \Omega(n/2^N)$.

Our first key observation is that this function enjoys the special property of self-reducibility: if we feed it $N$ uniform independent random variables, and fix any $N-K$ of them to nonzero values, then we simply obtain an instance of $FFM_K : (\{0,1\}^N)^K \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ called on independent uniform random variables. We will now describe how to use this property to lift the known NOF lower bounds against $FFM_N$ to BCP lower bounds. The overview below will actually obtain lower bounds against non-adaptive BCPs, as there is an easy way to transform these into lower bounds against adaptive BCPs (see full version).

The main idea is as follows. Let $g : (\{0,1\}^N)^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu$ be the transcript (bits written on the blackboard) of an arbitrary non-adaptive BCP; that is, $g \in nBCP(p,\mu)$. In order to show that $CC_{BCP}^N (FFM_N) > \mu$, we just need to show that $FFM_N(X)$ becomes constant with probability less than 1 upon fixing $g(X)$, where $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N)$ is uniform over $\{0,1\}^N$. In order to leverage the self-reducibility of $FFM_N$, we would like to somehow find a set $S \subseteq [N]$ of $t$ random variables $\{X_i\}_{i \in S}$ with the guarantee that no leaked bit in $g$ depends on all of them (in other words, during no round were all of the parties in $S$ involved in a joint collusion). If we can find such a set $S$, then we can fix all random variables outside of that set. The value $FFM_N(X)$ then becomes $FFM_1((X_i)_{i \in S})$, while $g(X)$ becomes $g'((X_i)_{i \in S})$ for some NOF protocol $g'$. Thus, by applying the NOF lower bounds from [18], we immediately get bounds of the form $CC_{BCP}^N (FFM_N) \geq \Omega(n/2^t)$. This basic idea can be seen as a significant generalization of an idea of Podolskii and Sherstov [51], who obtained NOF communication complexity lower bounds that are at most logarithmic in the input length allowing for higher number of parties (see full version for more details).

Thus, in order to get the best possible lower bounds for $CC_{BCP}^N (FFM_N)$, we would like to find such a set $S$ with as small size $t$ as possible.\footnote{If we are dealing with some specialized type of BCP that guarantees the existence of such a set by definition, then of course we can stop here and get very strong complexity bounds of the form $CC_{BCP}^N (FFM_N) \geq \Omega(n/2^t)$. But this will not be the case for general BCPs with collusion bound $p$.}

The first idea in this direction is to attempt to find such a subset with size $t = p+1$: this is of course always possible, since every such subset of this size is guaranteed to never work together in a joint collusion, simply by the fact that the collusion bound in $g$ is $p$. This immediately produces bounds of the form $CC_{BCP}^N (FFM_N) \geq \Omega(n/2^{p+1}) = \Omega(n/2^p)$. While these are better than the general NOF bound $\Omega(n/2^N)$ for small $p$, they become trivial whenever $p > \log n$. We would like to try to handle much larger collusion.

To go beyond the logarithmic barrier, the key idea is to consider the round bound $\mu$, and notice that sometimes we can actually find such a subset of size $t < p+1$, if there are not too many rounds of communication. In particular, let us fix $t \in [1,N]$ to some value that will be chosen later, and observe that there are $\binom{N}{t}$ subsets with the desired “non-joint” property at the beginning of the protocol. Furthermore, each time a bit is leaked, it can depend on at most $p$ parties, and thus at most $\binom{t}{p}$ subsets of size $t$ will lose the “non-joint” property that we desire. Thus, as long as $\mu(\binom{t}{p}) < \binom{N}{t}$, we will always be left with at least one subset with the desired property. By reordering this inequality and applying Stirling’s formula, the condition $\mu < \Omega((N/p)!)$ also suffices. Thus, we immediately get that for any round bound $\mu$ that obeys both $\mu < \Omega((N/p)!)$ (so that we can find a “non-joint” subset) and $\mu < \Omega(n/2^t)$ (to ensure that we can apply the NOF lower bounds of the self-reduced $FFM_N$ function), it holds that $CC_{BCP}^N (FFM_N) \geq \mu$. Thus, setting $t = \min \left\{ \frac{\log n}{\log \log(N/p) + t}, N \right\}$ immediately gives Theorem 1, which in particular provides us with polynomial lower bounds against $p = 0.99N$ collusion, for any $N,n$.

B. LREs against BCPs for polylogarithmic entropy

It turns out that without too much more work, we can actually equip the function $FFM_N$ with a few simple add-ons so that it becomes an explicit function with much stronger correlation bounds than those advertised in Theorem 1 (and outlined in the previous section). Indeed, in this section we will outline the proof of Theorem 2, which shows that we can turn $FFM_N$ into a leakage-resilient extractor against BCPs with excellent parameters.

The first step is to augment $FFM_N$ so that it achieves high average-case (or distributional) communication complexity against NOF protocols. Luckily, in addition to worst-case bounds, Ford and Gål provide exactly such average-case bounds. In particular, in [18] the authors show that $CC_{NOF}^N (FFM_N) \geq \Omega(n/2^N)$ for $\epsilon = 2^{-\Omega(n/2^N)}$. Thus, they strengthen their worst case bound to show that, not only do NOF protocols with $\Omega(n/2^N)$ rounds fail to compute $FFM_N$ everywhere, every such protocol offers no more than an exponentially small advantage over a trivial (constant) protocol. Furthermore, by Remark 2, this immediately tells us that for any $g \in NOF(\mu)$, it holds that $|FFM_N(X) \circ g(X) - U_1 \circ g(X)| \leq \epsilon$, where $X$ is uniform over $\{0,1\}^N$, $U_1$ is independent from $X$, and $\mu = \Omega(n/2^N)$. This tells us that $FFM_N : (\{0,1\}^N)^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is a leakage-resilient extractor against NOF($\mu$) for entropy $k = n$ with error $\epsilon$, where $\mu, \epsilon$ are as above.

The next step is to augment this leakage-resilient extractor so that it can output multiple bits, and in particular we would like $m = \mu$ bits of output. While this extension is not provided in [18], we show that it is straightforward to apply standard XOR lemmas ([52]) to character sums that
appear in their paper in order to prove this result. As a result, we obtain a function \( \text{prodExt}_N : \{(0,1)^n\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) which is simply a version of \( \text{FFM}_N \) that can output multiple bits (by taking the first \( m \) bits produced from multiplying its inputs over \( \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \), instead of just the first bit). It is now immediate that \( \text{prodExt}_N : \{(0,1)^n\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) is a leakage-resilient extractor against NOF(\( \mu \)) for entropy \( k = n \) with error \( \epsilon \) and output length \( m \), where \( \mu, \epsilon, m \) are as above. Furthermore, at this point, we could plug \( \text{prodExt} \) into the analysis of Section II-A to see that \( \text{prodExt} \) is also an explicit leakage-resilient extractor against BCP(\( p, \mu \)) for min-entropy \( k = n \), with output length \( m = \mu \) and error \( \epsilon = 2^{-\mu} \), where \( \mu = \Omega \left( n^{\log(2^{2^n})} \right) \). This yields a “uniform” version of Theorem 2, with slightly better parameters.

We now arrive at the interesting part of the construction: dropping the entropy requirement. We start with the observation that without any further modifications, \( \text{prodExt} \) actually works when given sources that are missing a little min-entropy, simply by treating them as leakage. The permissible missing entropy, however, is extremely small - even for \( N = O(1) \) sources, this approach could never do better than requiring \( k \geq 0.99 N \). Luckily, however, this “near-uniform” leakage-resilient extractor is just good enough to enable the next step, and, heart, of our construction.

The main idea is to preprocess the inputs to \( \text{prodExt} \) using a low-error strong two-source condenser \( 2\text{Cond} : \{(0,1)^n\}^2 \rightarrow \{0,1\}^t \) for polylogarithmic min-entropy. Given two independent sources, such an object is guaranteed to output a source with extremely high entropy, even upon fixing one of the inputs (with high probability). An explicit construction of such an object was only recently designed by Ben-Aroya et al. [53], but it has already found great use in extractor constructions.

We are now ready to construct our LRE that can handle polylogarithmic entropy. The idea is to simply sacrifice one of the sources to use as a common seed across \( N - 1 \) condenser calls (one for every other source). Then, the outputs of these condenser calls are fed into \( \text{prodExt} \). More formally, we construct our low-entropy LRE, which we call \( \text{leProdExt} : \{(0,1)^n\}^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) as follows: on input \( X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N) \), define \( Y_i := \text{2Cond}(X_i, X_N) \), for each \( i \in [N - 1] \). Then, construct \( \text{prodExt} : \{(0,1)^n\}^{N-1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) as before, and simply output \( \text{prodExt}(Y_1, \ldots, Y_{N-1}) \).

To prove that this leakage-resilient extractor achieves the parameters advertised in Theorem 2, all that we need to do is fix the common seed \( X_1 \), and by a union bound, each random variable \( Y_i, i \in [N-1] \) obtains extremely high min-entropy. Furthermore, fixing \( X_1 \) makes \( Y_i \), a deterministic function of \( X_i \), for each \( i \in [N-1] \), and thus these random variables are all independent. This essentially completes the reduction from the low-entropy case for \( \text{leProdExt} \) to the near-uniform case for \( \text{prodExt} \), whose analysis we already know, from above. All that remains is the simple observation that leaks we must provide resilience against are still acting on \( \{X_i\}_{i \in [N-1]} \), whereas we need them to be acting on \( \{Y_i\}_{i \in [N-1]} \), the inputs to \( \text{prodExt} \) in order to apply this extractor’s leakage-resilience properties.

A compiler that produces LREs against BCPs: Above, we discussed how we can transform a single explicit function (\( \text{FFM}_N \)) with lower bounds against NOF protocols into a much stronger object: a leakage-resilient extractor against BCPs for polylogarithmic min-entropy. Given this construction, it is natural to wonder whether there exists a general transformation, or compiler, that could transform any explicit functions with NOF lower bounds into LREs against BCPs. Such a compiler would be useful because it would be guaranteed to produce improved leakage-resilient extractors as NOF bounds are strengthened over time. In the full version of our paper, we explicitly construct exactly such an object.

The spirit of our compiler is very similar to that of our simple LRE that is discussed above. However, several complications arise from the fact that our construction above relied heavily on \( \text{FFM}_N \) in a black box manner. In particular, we relied on its self-reducibility, in the sense that \( \text{FFM}_N \) looks like \( \text{FFM}_t \) on any \( t \) of its inputs. If we wish to simulate this behavior in a black box manner (with an arbitrary function hard that has NOF lower bounds), one natural idea is to make a call to hard over every \( t \)-tuple of inputs, and take the bitwise XOR of the results. But even if the sources are uniform, we immediately run into a problem: if \( t = \omega(1) \), then this construction is no longer efficient.

We circumvent the above issue by using a sampler over the sources to select \( t \)-tuples, instead of brute-forcing over all of them. But now, if we wish to drop the entropy of the sources by even just a little, this could incur too large an error in the sampler, which was expecting to receiving uniform bits. It turns out, however, that by sacrificing an additional source and using some extra two-source extractor calls, we can bypass this issue as well. As a result, we are able to successfully adapt the \( \text{FFM}_N \)-to-LRE transformation above to work with an arbitrary NOF-hard function in a black box manner, and thereby construct an explicit compiler.

C. LREs against NOFs via exponential sums

Our polylogarithmic extractor described above works for all \( p \leq N - 2 \). The case \( p = N - 1 \) corresponding to NOF leakage seems much more difficult. In this case, relying on recent results in additive combinatorics, we are still able to construct extractors that can handle min-entropy \( k \geq 0.3n \). Our starting point towards this Theorem 3 is the result of Kamp, Rao, Vadhan, and Zuckerman [54], who
used exponential sum estimates of Bourgain, Glibichuk, and Konyagin [55] to construct extractors having any constant min-entropy rate with only a constant number of independent sources.

To give our extractor construction, we begin with some notation. Let $\mathbb{F}_q$ be the prime field of cardinality $q$. Inspired by the extractor of Bourgain [22] and Kamp et al. [54], our $n$ source extractor $\text{Ext} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ is defined as:

$$\text{BouExt}(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \text{sign} \left( \frac{2\pi \prod_{i \in [n]} x_i}{q} \right)$$

where sign is the usual sign function defined as $\text{sign}(x) = 1$ if and only if $x \geq 0$. Bourgain [22] noted that the above is an extractor for rate $\delta$ if we can obtain non-trivial upper bounds on the following exponential sum:

$$\left| \sum_{x_1 \in X_1} \cdots \sum_{x_n \in X_n} e_q \left( \prod_{i \in [n]} x_i \right) \right|.$$

Here $e_q$ is the exponential function defined as $e_q(x) = \exp \left( \frac{2\pi x}{q} \right)$ and $X_1, \ldots, X_n$ are arbitrary subsets of $\mathbb{F}_q$ of size $q^\ell$. Bounds with optimal subset sizes have been obtained by Bourgain [56].

Intuitively, notice that the choice of $x_2$ is independent of the choice of $x_1$, and thus, the sums as above correspond to independent source extractors. To model sources correlated by NOF leakage we would need to look for a richer class of exponential sums. For example, to model 3 sources against NOF leakage, we can use three indicator functions (traditionally known as cylinders), $\phi_{1,2}, \phi_{2,3}, \phi_{1,3}$ each of the form $\mathbb{F}_q^3 \rightarrow \{0,1\}$. In more detail, the cylinder $\phi_{1,2}$ decides whether or not to sum over the input $x_1, x_2$, modelling the correlation between the pair of sources. Correlation between every pair of sources, can then be modelled as the product of these three cylinders (traditionally known as cylinder-intersection [17]). Formally,

$$\phi(x_1, x_2, x_3) = \phi_{1,2}(x_1, x_2) \times \phi_{2,3}(x_2, x_3) \times \phi_{1,3}(x_1, x_3)$$

Plugging this results in the following type of exponential sum:

$$\left| \sum_{x_1 \in X_1} \sum_{x_2 \in X_2} \sum_{x_3 \in X_3} \phi(x_1, x_2, x_3) e_q \left( \prod_{i \in [3]} x_i \right) \right|.$$

Fortunately, such multi-linear exponential sums have been recently considered in the additive combinatorics literature starting with the work of Petridis and Shparlinski [57], who obtained concrete bounds for the special cases of 3 and 4 sources. Very recently, Kerr and Macourt [58] generalized the result to $N$ sources for $N < \ll \log \log q$. Moreover, it has been shown in [17] that each possible transcript of an NOF protocol induces a cylinder-intersection on its inputs. This observation allows us to rely on the above multi-linear exponential sum lower bounds to prove that $\text{BouExt}$ is in fact a $(N-1, N, \mu)$-cylinder-intersection extractors. In the full version we consider more general exponential sums which may be of independent interest.

### D. Leakage-resilient secret sharing schemes

We first construct secret sharing schemes resilient against adaptive but disjoint leakage, and then further extend it to obtain our Theorem 4 against overlapping leakage. We begin by considering a leader-based $t$-out-of-$N$ scheme, which at first sight looks artificial, but proves instrumental in both our results. Our notion can be seen as a generalization of an idea present in the recent work of Aggarwal et al. [43], who implicitly designed leader based 2-out-of-$N$ schemes against non-adaptive and individual leakage, while designing general LRSS schemes in the same leakage model.

**Leader-based $t$-out-of-$N$ schemes.** For any “leader” $\ell \in [N]$, we define and construct $t$-out-of-$N$ schemes for leader $\ell$, that allows the leader and any $t-1$ other parties to reconstruct the secret. More importantly, it guarantees that the transcript of any protocol amongst the two unauthorized subsets, namely, $[N] \setminus \{\ell\}$ and $[N] \setminus \{\ell\}$, reveals nothing about the underlying secret.

**Use leader-based schemes to get regular SS schemes.** The idea would be to share the secret using any regular $t$-out-of-$N$ scheme to obtain $n$ shares $m_1, \ldots, m_N \leftarrow \text{Share}_N^t(m)$, and make each of the $N$ parties the leader for exactly one of these shares. That is, $m_i$ is shared using a $t$-out-of-$N$ scheme for leader $i$. Notice that any set of less than $t$ parties of the final scheme can only have at most $t-1$ leaders and consequently the secret will be hidden. To prove leakage-resilience, we use a hybrid argument to rely on the leakage-resilience ensured by our leader-based scheme for each choice of leader. It is not hard to generalize this result to general access structures, and we defer the details to full version.

**Leakage-Resilience against BCPs.** We next sketch the proof of Theorem 4. We first describe the basic construction of LRSSs [15] which we will rely on. The construction in [15] can be abstracted as follows:

1. Use a function hard for $p$-party NOF protocols (in a black-box way) to get a $(p, t = p + 1, n = p + 1)$-LRSS. Note that the threshold equals the number of parties.
2. Use several instantiations of $(p, p + 1, p + 1)$-LRSS along with perfect hash families to build $(p, t, n)$-LRSS.

Both of these steps hit barriers at $p = \omega(\log n)$ in [15]: The first step blows up the share-length by a $2^p$ factor owing to the use of NOF lower bounds and the second step incurs another $2^{O(p)}$ factor owing to the use of perfect hash families [59].
If we use our average-case lower bounds against BCP, as opposed to NOF lower bounds, we can already implement the step (1) above without losing a $2^p$ factor as long as $p$ is any constant fraction of $N$. The main hurdle is now in implementing step (2) efficiently when $p = \omega(\log N)$. But we need a new idea as there are information theoretic lower bounds against perfect hash families [60]. We introduce two additional ingredients to circumvent this hurdle: ramp hash families and leader based threshold secret sharing schemes.

**Ramp Hash Families.** Inspired by the ramp secret sharing literature [61], [62] and covering hash families as defined in [63], we define ramp hash families as weaker analogues of perfect hash families.

**Definition 1 (Ramp hash families).** A family of hash functions $H = \{h : [N] \rightarrow [p]\}$ is called a $(p, t, N)$-ramp hash function family if for all subsets $T \subseteq [N]$ of cardinality $t$, there exists a function $h$ in the family such that $h$ is surjective on $T$ — that is, $\{h(i) : i \in T\} = [p]$.

Perfect hash families correspond to $(p, p, N)$-ramp hash families and necessarily need to have size at least $2^{\Theta(p)} \log n$ [60]. But, owing to a “coupon collector” phenomenon, if $t > C_p \log p$, then there exist $(p, t, N)$-ramp hash families with size $\mathrm{poly}(p)(\log n)$. One can then use the probabilistic method to argue existence of $(p, t, n)$-ramp hash functions. Such a property was first studied as covering in the work of Alon et al. [63], who asked for the stronger requirement that a random hash function from $H$ be surjective on any fixed set $T$ with high probability. We will use explicit efficient construction of such families of size $\mathrm{poly}(\log n, p)$ due to Meka, Reingold, and Zhou [64].

Given ramp hash families as above, we can implement the second step of [15] (which in turn is based on a classical idea of Kurosawa and Stinson from 90s– [65], [66]) to get “ramp” secret sharing schemes that are leakage resilient for $p = O(t/\log t)$ but satisfy a weaker secrecy guarantee. Concretely, while any $t$ parties can recover the secret, no $p$-parties can reconstruct the secret. However, some set of $p+1$ shares may reveal the secret whereas we need to ensure that no $t-1$ parties can learn anything about the secret.

**Stronger Leader-based t-out-of-n schemes.** To fix the secrecy issue we rely on our notion of leader based scheme, albeit a stronger one. Apart from the reconstruction property as in the disjoint case, now we also require that the transcript of any BCP, along with all but the leader’s shares, reveal nothing about the underlying secret. To achieve this, we need to strengthen our communication complexity lower bounds in our Theorem 1 to also hold when we additionally allow one set of $n-1$ parties to collude, apart from the usual $p$-party collusion. Fortunately, our techniques can be easily generalized to this setting. We can then proceed as in the disjoint case, and use these leader-based schemes to get regular $t$-out-of-$n$ SS schemes, proving leakage-resilience by an appropriately modified hybrid argument.

**III. PRELIMINARIES**

We provide here formal definitions of the objects discussed informally in the introduction (BCPs, communication complexity, leakage-resilient / cylinder-intersection extractors against BCPs, and leakage-resilient secret sharing against BCPs). Additionally, we provide some basic notation and concepts regarding probability and finite fields. The reader should feel free to skip this section and return should anything become unclear.

**A. Basic notation, definitions, and objects**

**Notation:** Throughout, we let $\circ$ denote string concatenation. For a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, we let $x_i$ denote the value at its $i$th coordinate, and we let $x_S$ for some $S \subseteq [n]$ denote the concatenation of all $x_i, i \in S$, in increasing order of $i$. For a string $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ and $i \in [n]$, we let $x_i$ denote its $i$th chunk of $n$ consecutive bits, and for a set $S \subseteq [n]$, we define $x_S$ as the concatenation of all chunks indexed by $i \in S$.

**Probability:** The min-entropy of a random variable $X$ over $\{0, 1\}^n$ is defined as $\min_{x \in \text{support}(X)} \log(1/\Pr[X=x])$, and $X$ is said to be an $(n, k)$ source if it has min-entropy at least $k$. The statistical distance between distributions $X$ and $Y$ over $\{0, 1\}^n$, is defined as $|X-Y| : = \frac{1}{2} \sum_{v \in \{0,1\}^n} |\Pr[X=v] - \Pr[Y=v]|$, or equivalently, $\max_{S \subseteq [n]} |\Pr[X \in S] - \Pr[Y \in S]|$.

**B. Bounded collusion protocols**

While we believe the informal definitions of BCPs (provided in the introduction) to be much more illuminating, we provide here the formal definitions of non-adaptive and adaptive BCPs from Kumar, Meka and Sahai [15].

**Definition 2.** A function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\mu$ is in the class of non-adaptive bounded collusion protocols $\text{nBCP}_{N, n}(p, \mu)$ if: for every $i \in [\mu]$, there exists a subset $S_i \subseteq [N]$ of size $p$, and a function $g_i : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\mu$ such that for every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, it holds that $f(x) = (y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_\mu)$, where $y_i := g_i(x_{S_i})$, for every $i \in [\mu]$.

**Definition 3.** A function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\mu$ is in the class of adaptive bounded collusion protocols $\text{BCP}_{N, n}(p, \mu)$ if: for every $i \in [\mu]$, there exists a subset function $S_i : \{0, 1\}^{n(i-1)} \rightarrow \{N\}$, and a function $g_i : \{0, 1\}^{n(i-1)} \times \{0, 1\}^\mu \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^\mu$ such that for every $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$, it holds that $f(x) = (y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_\mu)$, where $y_i := g_i(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_{i-1}, x_{S_i(y_1, y_2, \ldots, y_{i-1})})$, for every $i \in [\mu]$. For ease of exposition, we will occasionally shorten the names of these classes. For example, when $N, n$ are clear from context, we will drop the subscripts of the class names, and when $p, \mu$ are also clear from context, we simply write $\text{nBCP}$ and $\text{BCP}$. Furthermore, we define number-on-forehead protocols and number-in-hand protocols in the
expected way: we let $n\text{NOF}(\mu) := n\text{BCP}(N-1, \mu)$ and $\text{NOF}(\mu) := \text{BCP}(N-1, \mu)$, and let $n\text{NH} (\mu) := n\text{BCP}(1, \mu)$ and $\text{NH}(\mu) := \text{BCP}(1, \mu)$.

Next, we extend the definition of communication complexity against NOF and NH protocols to BCPs in the expected way, and also provide an alternative definition that will be useful later on.

**Definition 4.** The communication complexity of a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ against BCPs with collusion bound $p$, denoted $\text{CC}^p(f)$, is defined as the minimum $\mu$ such that there exists some $g : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu \in \text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ such that for every $x \in \{0,1\}^n$, it holds that $f(x) = g(x)$.

**Remark 1.** We can equivalently define $\text{CC}^p(f)$ as the minimum $\mu$ such that there exists some $g : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu \in \text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ such that if we sample $X$ uniformly from $\{0,1\}^n$, then with probability 1 over fixing $g(X)$, it holds that $f(X)$ becomes fixed (i.e., a constant).

We now do the same for distributonal (average-case) communication complexity.

**Definition 5.** The $c$-distributonal communication complexity of a function $f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ against BCPs with collusion bound $p$, denoted $\text{CC}^c(f)$, is defined as the minimum $\mu$ such that there exists some $g : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu \in \text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ such that $\mathbb{E}_{X} [f(X)] = g(X)_1$ with probability at least $(1+\epsilon)/2$ over sampling $X$ uniformly from $\{0,1\}^n$.

**Remark 2.** Up to constant factors, we can equivalently define $\text{CC}^c(f)$ as the minimum $\mu$ such that there exists some $g : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu \in \text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ such that if we sample $X$ uniformly at random from $\{0,1\}^n$, then $|f(X) - g(X)| \leq \epsilon$, where $U_1$ is independent from $g(X)$.

**C. Randomness extractors**

In this paper, we study a much stronger (and more general) version of classical extractors, called a leakage-resilient extractors (LREs). Such extractors offer the additional guarantee that their output looks uniform even conditioned on leakage from certain families of functions.

**Definition 6.** Let $\mathcal{X}$ be a family of sources over $\{0,1\}^n$, and $\mathcal{F} \subseteq \{ f : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu \}$ a family of leakage functions. A function $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^\mu$ is a leakage-resilient extractor (LRE) against $\mathcal{F}$ for the family $\mathcal{X}$, with error $\epsilon$, if for every $X \in \mathcal{X}, f \in \mathcal{F}$,

$$|\text{Ext}(X) \circ f(X) - U_m \circ f(X)| \leq \epsilon,$$

where $U_m$ is independent from $f(X)$.

The particular type of LREs that we examine in this paper are cylinder-intersection extractors, which are multi-source extractors that offer leakage-resilience against BCPs:

**Definition 7** ([15]). A function $\text{Ext} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is a $(p, N, \mu)$-cylinder intersection extractor for $(n, k)$ sources and error $\epsilon$ if $\text{Ext}$ is an LRE against $\text{BCP}_{N,n}(p, \mu)$ with error $\epsilon$, for the family of sources $X$ where each $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N) \in \mathcal{X}$ consists of $N$ independent $(n, k)$ sources. Equivalently, we also call such objects LREs against BCPs.

Given Definition 6, Definition 7, and Remark 2, it is easy to see that cylinder-intersection extractors are strictly stronger than average-case lower bounds against BCPs.

We now proceed to give an overview of our constructions.

**IV. Explicit LREs against BCPs**

As discussed in the overview, the foundation of our leakage-resilient extractors is the finite field multiplication function $\text{FFM}_{N} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}$. This function takes as input $N$ bitstrings of length $n$, treats them as elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, takes their product over this field, interprets the result again as a bitstring over $\{0,1\}^n$, and outputs the first bit. In [18], Ford and Gál show that $\text{CC}^\text{NOF}(\text{FFM}_{N}) \geq \Omega(n/2^N)$ for $\epsilon = 2^{-\Omega(n/2^N)}$, thereby proving strong average-case lower bounds against this very simple function.

As a first step in transforming $\text{FFM}_{N}$ into a low-entropy LRE against BCPs, we slightly modify this function so that it can output many bits. In particular, for $m \leq n$, we let $\sigma_{n,m} : \mathbb{F}_{2^n} \rightarrow \mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ denote the function that interprets its input as an element of $\mathbb{F}_{2^m}$ and projects it onto its first $m$ coordinates, and we define a multi-bit output version of $\text{FFM}_{N}$ as follows.

**Definition 8.** For any $N, n, m \in \mathbb{N}$ with $n \geq m$, the product extractor $\text{prodExt} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ is defined as:

$$\text{prodExt}(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N) := \sigma_{n,m}(x_1 \cdot x_2 \cdot \ldots \cdot x_N),$$

where the input/output are interpreted as elements of $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, and the product is taken over this field.

We remark that, using the standard encoding of $\mathbb{F}_{2^n}$, it is straightforward to perform all the above operations in $\text{poly}(n, N)$ time (see, e.g., [20]). Now, because we have modified the original extractor from [18], we are not be able to apply their correlation bound on FFM as a black box in order to show that $\text{prodExt}$ is a basic leakage-resilient extractor. Instead, we dig into their proof and show that the main character sum in their work can be combined with standard XOR lemmas [52] to yield the following:

**Lemma 1.** For all $N, n \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $N \geq 2$, the product extractor $\text{prodExt} : \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ from Definition 8 is an explicit leakage-resilient extractor against $n\text{NOF}(\mu)$ for entropy $k = n$ and leakage $\mu = \xi$, output length $m = \xi$, and error $\epsilon = 2^{-\xi}$, where $\xi = \Omega(n/2^N)$.

As the techniques used to prove Lemma 1 are relatively standard, we refer the reader to a full version of the paper for a proof.
A. Handling more leakage when there is less collusion

Next, we show that without any further modifications, prodExt can handle leakage from BCPs across a very general range of parameters, and furthermore achieve a nontrivial tradeoff between leakage (complexity) and collusion. In particular, we prove the following lemma, and note that we optimize to pick a good setting for $t$ in Section IV-C.

**Lemma 2.** For all sufficiently large $N, n \in \mathbb{N}$ and any $t, p \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $t \leq n$ and $p \leq N - 1$, the product extractor $\text{prodExt} : (\{0, 1\}^n)^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ from Definition 8 is an explicit leakage-resilient extractor against $n\text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ for entropy $k = n$ and leakage $\mu < \min\{\xi, \binom{n}{t}/2^t\}$, with output length $m = \xi$ and error $\epsilon = 2^{1-2^{\xi}}$, where $\xi = \Omega(n/2^t)$.

**Proof:** We must show that for $N$ independent uniform sources $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N)$ and any $\text{Leak} \in n\text{BCP}(p, \mu)$ with $\mu < \xi$ and $\mu < \binom{n}{t}/2^t$, $|\text{prodExt}(X) \circ \text{Leak}(X) - U_m \circ \text{Leak}(X)| \leq \epsilon$, where $\epsilon = 2^{1-2}$. For brevity, let $Z_1 := \text{prodExt}(X) \circ \text{Leak}(X)$ and $Z_2 := U_m \circ \text{Leak}(X)$ and show $|Z_1 - Z_2| \leq \epsilon$. By Definition 2, there must exist some $S_1,\ldots,S_p \subseteq [N]$, each of size $p$, and some functions $g_1,\ldots,g_p : (\{0, 1\}^n)^p \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ such that $\text{Leak}(X) = (g_1(X_{S_1}),\ldots,g_p(X_{S_p}))$. Thus:

$Z_1 := \text{prodExt}(X) \circ g_1(X_{S_1}) \circ \cdots \circ g_p(X_{S_p})$,

$Z_2 := U_m \circ g_1(X_{S_1}) \circ \cdots \circ g_p(X_{S_p})$.

The goal now is to perform fixings so as to simplify the analysis to let us apply Lemma 1 over $t$ sources. We proceed as follows. First, notice that each of the $\mu$ subsets $S_i$ has size $p$, and can therefore hold at most $\binom{p}{t}$ distinct subsets of size $t$. Thus, since we are told $\mu < \binom{p}{t}$, there must be some good $G \subseteq \binom{[N]}{t}$ where $G \nsubseteq S_i, \forall i \in [\mu]$. Without loss of generality, we may assume $G = [t]$ (any other case uses almost exactly the same ideas that follow, but the notation gets a little cumbersome). We let $G = [N] \setminus G$, and by definition of statistical distance, we know that $|Z_1 - Z_2| \leq |Z_1 \circ X_{\overline{G}} - Z_2 \circ X_{\overline{G}}|$. This means there is some fixed $X^* \in (\{0, 1\}^n)^{N-t}$ such that

$|Z_1 - Z_2| \leq |(Z_1 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*) - (Z_2 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*)|$.

Now, to see that this quantity is bounded above by $\epsilon$, we just have to carefully rewrite the random variables. First, we note that it is safe to assume that $X_i^* \neq 0$, for all $i \in [N-t]$, at the expense of incurring a factor of $2^t$ in the error - this is because we can in fact preprocess the input to redirect zeroes to ones before calling prodExt; this decreases the entropy of each source by 1 bit, and we will see (in Lemma 3) that we can handle such a situation at the expense of blowing up the error by an exponential factor in the number of sources placed into the final prodExt call (which, here, is $t$ sources). Let us now examine the conditioned versions of $Z_1$ and $Z_2$.

We start by observing that $(\text{prodExt}(X) \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*) = \sigma_{n,m}(X_1,\ldots,X_t \mid X_{N-t}) = \text{prodExt}(X_1,\ldots,X_{N-t})$, where $\sigma = X_1^{\pi_1} \cdots X_{N-t}^{\pi_{N-t}}$ is some fixed nonzero value in $\mathbb{F}_2^n$. Furthermore, for any $i \in [\mu]$, observe that $(g_i(X_{S_i}) \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*)$ becomes the function $g_i^*(X_{S_i(\overline{G})})$, which is the restriction of $g_i$ obtained by fixing the variables $X_p, i \in S_i \cap \overline{G}$ according to $X^*$. By definition of $G$, we know $G \nsubseteq S_i$, and thus if we define $S'_i := S_i \cap G$, we know $S'_i \nsubseteq G$, and furthermore $(g_i(X_{S_i}) \mid X_{G} = X^*) = g_i(X_{S'_{G}})$. Thus we have:

$(Z_1 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*) = \text{prodExt}(X_1,\ldots,X_t \pi)$

$\circ g_i^*(X_{S'_{G}}) \circ \cdots \circ g_p^*(X_{S'_{G}})$, and

$(Z_2 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*) = U_m \circ g_i^*(X_{S'_{G}}) \circ \cdots \circ g_p^*(X_{S'_{G}})$.

Suppose now that we define $Y_i, i \in [t]$ as $Y_i := X_i$ when $i \in [t - 1]$, and $Y_i := X_i \pi$ when $i = t$. Then, for each $i \in [\mu]$, we define $g_i''$ to be identical to $g_i'$, except for the fact that if $g_i'$ receives $X_i$ as an input - say, as its $j^{th}$ argument - then $g_i''$ multiplies its $j^{th}$ input by the inverse of $\pi$ (in $\mathbb{F}_2^n$) before passing all its input into $g_i'$, and returning the result. By construction, such a function guarantees $g''(Y_{S_i}) = g''(X_{S'_i})$. And thus, we see that we can write:

$(Z_1 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*) = \text{prodExt}(Y_1,\ldots,Y_t)$

$\circ g_i''(Y_{S'_{G}}) \circ \cdots \circ g_p''(Y_{S'_{G}})$, and

$(Z_2 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*) = U_m \circ g_i''(Y_{S'_{G}}) \circ \cdots \circ g_p''(Y_{S'_{G}})$.

Since $Y_i$ is just a permutation of $X_i$, it must have the same entropy, and furthermore note that each $g_i''$ acts as non-adaptive NOF leakage on $Y_1,\ldots,Y_t$, since $S'_i \nsubseteq [t]$. Thus we can use Lemma 1 to bound the difference $|(Z_1 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*) - (Z_2 \mid X_{\overline{G}} = X^*)|$ as desired, completing the proof.

B. Reducing the entropy requirement

In this section, we will show how to improve the entropy requirement of prodExt from $k = n$ all the way to $k = \text{polylog} n$, ultimately proving Theorem 2. The first step we take in this direction is a modest one: we show that without any further modifications, prodExt will still work if its inputs are missing just a little entropy. More generally, we prove the following result:

**Lemma 3.** Let Ext : $(\{0, 1\}^n)^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ be a leakage-resilient extractor against $n\text{NOF}(\mu)$ for entropy $k = n$ and error $\epsilon$. Then for any $0 < k \leq n$, Ext is also a leakage-resilient extractor against $n\text{NOF}(\mu - 2)$ for entropy $k$ and error $\epsilon \cdot 2^{-N(n-k)}$.

**Proof:** Given $N$ independent $(n, k)$ sources $X = (X_1,\ldots,X_N)$ and any $\text{Leak} \in n\text{NOF}(\mu - 2)$, we wish to upper bound the quantity

$|\text{Ext}(X) \circ \text{Leak}(X) - U_m \circ \text{Leak}(X)|.$
We may assume that each source $X_i$ is flat; i.e., uniform over some $T_i \subseteq \{0,1\}^n$ of size $2^k$ (this is a standard assumption that can be done without loss of generality; see, e.g., [20]). The main idea of this proof is to treat the missing entropy as leakage on uniform sources, by defining a function belonging to nNOF(2) that identifies the support of $(X_1, \ldots, X_N)$. In particular, we define the indicator function $id : (\{0,1\}^N) \rightarrow (\{0,1\})^2$ as the map $(x_1, \ldots, x_N) \mapsto (y_1, y_2)$, where $y_1 = 1$ if and only if $x_i \in T_i$, for all $i \in [N-1]$, and $y_2 = 1$ if and only if $x_N \in T_N$. Furthermore, we define $\tilde{t} := (1,1)$. Given these definitions, it is straightforward to verify that $id(x) = \tilde{t}$ if and only if $x \in T_1 \times \cdots \times T_N$, and that $id \in \text{nNOF}(2)$. Thus, if we define and function $\text{Leak}' : (\{0,1\}^N) \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^\mu$ that maps $x \mapsto (\text{Leak}(x), id(x))$, then $\text{Leak}' \in \text{nNOF}(\mu)$, and we may use it to upper bound Equation (1):

$$\|\text{Ext}(x) \circ \text{Leak}(x) - U_m \circ \text{Leak}(x)\| = \|\text{Ext}(U_n) \mid id(U_n) = \tilde{t}) \circ \text{Leak}(U_n) \mid id(U_n) = \tilde{t}) - U_m \circ \text{Leak}(U_n) \mid id(U_n) = \tilde{t})\| \leq \|\text{Ext}(U_n) \circ \text{Leak}(U_n) \circ id(U_n) - U_m \circ \text{Leak}(U_n) \circ id(U_n)|/Pr[id(U_n) = \tilde{t})| \leq \epsilon \cdot 2N(n-k),$$

where the first inequality is a Markov-type inequality, and the second inequality follows from the hypothesis.

The key object we need in order to drop the entropy requirement of our extractor down to $k \geq \text{polylog}(n)$ is a low-error strong two-source condenser. Ben-Aroya et al. [53] recently constructed such objects with excellent parameters; most relevant to us here will be the following specialization of one of their more general results:

**Theorem 5** ([53]). There exist universal constants $C > 0$ and $\gamma := 1/C$ such that for every $n, k, m \in \mathbb{N}$ and $\epsilon > 0$ satisfying $k \geq \log^C n$ and $k^\gamma \geq m$ and $\epsilon \geq 2^{-k^{1/2}}$, there exists an explicit function $2\text{Cond} : (\{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ such that for any two independent $(n, k)$ sources $X_1, X_2$, with probability $1 - \epsilon$ over $x_2 \sim X_2$, the output has min-entropy $H_\infty(2\text{Cond}(X_1, x_2)) \geq m - \sqrt{m}$.

With this condenser in hand, we are ready to define our final, low-entropy, version of the product-extractor:

**Definition 9.** For a sufficiently large constant $C \geq 1$ and any $N,n,k,m_0,m \in \mathbb{N}$ satisfying $k \geq \log^C n$ and $k^\gamma \geq m_0 \geq m$, let $2\text{Cond} : (\{0,1\}^n \times \{0,1\}^n \rightarrow \{0,1\}^{m_0}$ be the condenser for $(n,k)$ sources from Theorem 5, and let $\text{prodExt}((\{0,1\})^m)^{N-1} \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$ be the product extractor from Definition 8. We define the low entropy product extractor, $\text{leProdExt} : (\{0,1\}^n)^N \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m$, as

$$\text{leProdExt}(x_1, x_2, \ldots, x_N) := \text{prodExt}(2\text{Cond}(x_i, x_N))_{i \in [N-1]}.$$

We now prove the main lemma of the section, which proves that $\text{leProdExt}$ can in fact handle low-entropy, while simultaneously achieving a leakage-collusion tradeoff similar to Lemma 2. We remark again here that we will optimize to pick a good setting for $t$ in Section IV-C.

**Lemma 4.** There is a constant $C \geq 1$ such that for all sufficiently large $N,n \in \mathbb{N}$ and any $t,p \in \mathbb{N}$ such that $t \leq N$ and $p \leq N - 2$, the low-entropy product extractor $\text{leProdExt} : (\{0,1\}^n)^N \rightarrow (\{0,1\}^m$ from Definition 9 is an explicit leakage-resilient extractor against nBCP($t,p$) for entropy $k \geq \log^C n$ and leakage $\mu \leq \min\{\xi, (N-1)^{-1}\}$, with output length $m = \xi$ and error $\epsilon = 2^{-\xi}$, where

$$\xi = k^{O(1)} / \mu^2.$$

**Proof:** We must show that for $N$ independent $(n,k)$ sources $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N)$, and any $\text{Leak} \in \text{nBCP}(p,\mu)$ with $\text{Leak} \in \text{nBCP}(p,\mu)$ with $\mu < \xi$ and $\mu(\xi) < (N-1)^{-1}$,

$$\|\text{leProdExt}(X) \circ \text{Leak}(X) - U_m \circ \text{Leak}(X)\| \leq \epsilon,$$

where $\epsilon = 2^{-\xi}$. For brevity, we let $Z_1 := \text{leProdExt}(X)$ and $Z_2 := U_m \circ \text{Leak}(X)$ and show $|Z_1 - Z_2| \leq \epsilon$.

By Definition 2, there must exist some $S_1, \ldots, S_\mu \subseteq [N]$, each of size $p$, and some functions $g_1, \ldots, g_\mu : (\{0,1\})^p \rightarrow \{0,1\}$ such that $\text{Leak}(X) = (g_1(X_{S_1}), \ldots, g_\mu(X_{S_\mu})$. Thus, substituting in the definition of $\text{leProdExt}$, we have

$$Z_1 := \text{prodExt}((2\text{Cond}(X_1, X_N))_{i \in [N-1]}$$

$$\circ g_1(X_{S_i}), \cdots, \circ g_\mu(X_{S_\mu}),$$

and

$$Z_2 := U_m \circ g_1(X_{S_i}), \cdots, \circ g_\mu(X_{S_\mu}).$$

We remark that any parameters in the construction itself (like condenser output length, condenser error, product extractor output length, etc.) will be set at the end so that everything works out.

The goal now is to perform fixings to reduce the analysis to the analysis in Lemma 2. We proceed as follows. First, notice that each of the $\mu$ subsets $S_i$ has size $p$, and can therefore hold at most $\binom{p}{t}$ distinct subsets of size $t$. Thus, since we are told $\mu(\xi) < (N-1)^{-1}$, there must be some good $G \subseteq [N-1]$ where $G \not\subseteq S_i, \forall i \in [\mu]$. Like in the proof to Lemma 2, we will assume, without loss of generality, that $G = [t]$.

Now, let us define $\epsilon_1$ as the error of $2\text{Cond}$, meaning that with probability $1 - \epsilon_1$ over $x_N \sim X_N$, $2\text{Cond}(X_i, X_N)$ has entropy at least $m_0 - \sqrt{m_0}$, for any single $i \in [N-1]$. Thus, by a union bound, with probability $1 - t\epsilon_1$ over $x_N \sim X_N$, every random variable in $\{2\text{Cond}(X_i, x_N) : i \in G\}$ has entropy at least $m_0 - \sqrt{m_0}$. In other words, there is always some $X_N^*$ such that the following is true:

$$|Z_1 - Z_2| \leq |Z_1 \circ X_N - Z_2 \circ X_N|$$

$$\leq t\epsilon_1 + \{|Z_1 \mid X_N = X_N^*\} - \{|Z_2 \mid X_N = X_N^*\},$$

where $2\text{Cond}(X_i, X_N^*)$ has entropy at least $m_0 - \sqrt{m_0}$, for each $i \in G$. We now define $Y_i := 2\text{Cond}(X_i, X_N^*)$ for each
\[ i \in [N - 1], \text{ and we notice that this collection of random variables are mutually independent (because they are single-argument deterministic functions of the independent random variables \( \{X_i\}_{i \in [N-1]} \)). We write } Y = Y_1 \cdots Y_{N-1}. \]

We now fix each \( X_i, i \notin G \cup \{N\} \) to some \( X_i^* \in \{0,1\}^n \) such that the following holds:

\[
|Z_1 | X_N = X_N^* | - (Z_2 | X_N = X_N^*) | \\
\leq |(Z_1 | X_i = X_i^*, \forall i \notin G) - (Z_2 | X_i = X_i^*, \forall i \notin G) |.
\]

Notice that as a result, each \( Y_i, i \notin G \cup \{N\} \), gets fixed to \( Y_i^* = 2\text{Cond}(X_i^*, X_N^*) \in \{0,1\}^m \), while each \( Y_i, i \in G \) still has entropy at least \( m_0 - \sqrt{m_0} \), and the collection \( \{Y_i : i \in G\} \) remains mutually independent. By following the exact same reasoning as in the proof to Lemma 2 about restrictions and the structure of \( \text{prodExt} \), we know that at this point we can write

\[
(Z_1 | X_i = X_i^*, \forall i \notin G) = \text{prodExt}(Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_{t-1}, Y_t \cdot \pi) \circ g_i'(Y_{S_i \cap G}) \circ \cdots \circ g_m'(Y_{S_m \cap G}) =: Z_1', \text{ and }
\]

\[
(Z_2 | X_i = X_i^*, \forall i \notin G) = U_m \circ g_1'(Y_{S_1 \cap G}) \circ \cdots \circ g_m'(Y_{S_m \cap G}) =: Z_2',
\]

where \( \pi = Y_{t+1} \cdots Y_{N-1}, \) and each \( g_i' \) is the appropriate restriction of \( g_i \) induced by the fixings of its inputs outside \( G \). We are nearly ready to apply the leakage-resilience of \( \text{prodExt} \) against NOF protocols and complete the proof. In order to arrive at this situation, we must somehow write each leakage function \( g_i \) as a function of random variables from \( \{Y_i : i \in G\} \) instead of \( \{X_i : i \in G\} \). It turns out this is not so difficult to do: we know that for each \( i \in [N-1], Y_i \) is a deterministic function of \( X_i \). As such, for each \( i \), we can find some randomness \( Q_i \) and a deterministic function sample such that \( Q_i \) is independent of \( Y_i \), and \( \text{sample}(Y_i, Q_i) \) is arbitrarily close to the distribution \( X_i \) for any fixed \( y \sim Y_i \), the function call \( \text{sample}(y, Q_i) \) simply uses \( Q_i \) to sample from \( X | Y = y \).\(^9\)

As always, we can fix the random variables \( \{Q_i' : i \in G\} \) to some values \( \{Q_i' \} \) without reducing the distance between \( Z_1', Z_2' \):

\[
|Z_1' - Z_2' | \leq |(Z_1' | Q_i = Q_i', \forall i \in G) - (Z_2' | Q_i = Q_i', \forall i \in G) |.
\]

Furthermore, under this conditioning, we know that each \( g_i'(Y_{S_i \cap G}) \) obtains the form \( g_i''(Y_{S_i \cap G}) \) for some other deterministic function \( g_i'' \), since we saw above that \( X_i \approx \text{sample}(Y_i, Q_i) \), and we have fixed all the variables \( \{Q_i : i \in G\} \). Thus, we may write:

\[
(Z_1' | Q_i = Q_i', \forall i \in G) = \text{prodExt}(Y_1, Y_2, \ldots, Y_{t-1}, Y_t \cdot \pi) \circ g_i''(Y_{S_i \cap G}) \circ \cdots \circ g_m''(Y_{S_m \cap G}),
\]

\[
(Z_2' | Q_i = Q_i', \forall i \in G) = U_m \circ g_1''(Y_{S_1 \cap G}) \circ \cdots \circ g_m''(Y_{S_m \cap G}).
\]

Using the same trick as in the proof to Lemma 2, we may remove \( \pi \) from the equation above, and thus we just assume now that it is no longer present. Thus, at last, we see that it suffices to upper bound \( |Z_1' - Z_2''| \), where

\[
Z_1'' := \text{prodExt}(Y_1, \ldots, Y_t) \circ g_1''(Y_{S_1 \cap G}) \circ \cdots \circ g_m''(Y_{S_m \cap G}),
\]

These random variables have a very special structure: the collection \( \{Y_i : i \in [t]\} \) are independent, and each is an \((m_0, m_0 - \sqrt{m_0})\) source, due to the parameters of 2Cond. Furthermore, we know \( G \cap S_i \subset G \), for all \( i \in [t] \), and thus each \( g_i \) is an NOF-lean on \( Y = Y_1 \circ \cdots \circ Y_t \).

Thus, to conclude, we combine Lemma 1 with Lemma 3 to see that \( \text{prodExt} : ((\{0,1\}^m)^t) \rightarrow \{0,1\}^m \) is a leakage-resilient extractor against \( n\text{NOF}(\mu_2 - 2) \) for entropy \( m_0 - \sqrt{m_0}, \) error \( \epsilon_3 = \epsilon_2 \cdot 2^t \sqrt{m_0} \), and output \( m = \gamma m_0 / 2^t \), where \( \epsilon_2 = 2^{-m} \) and \( \mu_2 = m \), for some small universal constant \( \gamma > 0 \). Furthermore, we know the sources \( Y_i, i \in [t] \) end up with the promised entropy \( m_0 - \sqrt{m_0} \) as long as \( k \geq \log^C n \) and \( k^{1/C} \geq m_0 \), with error \( \epsilon_1 = 2^{-k^{1/(2C)}} \), for some universal constant \( C \geq 1 \). Thus, the condenser and extractor will both work as long as this entropy is guaranteed, and as long as \( \mu < \mu_2 - 2 \) (because this means the concatenation of leaks \( g_1'' \cdots g_m'' \) is in \( n\text{NOF}(\mu_2 - 2) \)). Furthermore, its error will be

\[
\epsilon = |Z_1 - Z_2| = \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_3.
\]

Finally, recall that we required \( \mu = \left( \begin{smallmatrix} n \\ t \end{smallmatrix} \right) \) at the beginning to ensure we could find a good set \( G \). Thus, there exists some small constant \( c > 0 \) and function \( \xi(k, t) := k^c / 2^t \) such that as long as \( k \geq \log^C n \), and \( \mu < \min\{\xi(k, t) / \left( \begin{smallmatrix} n \\ t \end{smallmatrix} \right), \} \), and \( m \leq \xi \), it holds that \( |Z_1 - Z_2| = \epsilon = \epsilon_1 + \epsilon_3 \), which completes the proof.

\[ \blacksquare \]

\section{C. Adding adaptivity and wrapping up}

In this section, we record the four best results we have for our simple leakage-resilient extractor. We start by noting we obtain adaptive versions of Lemma 2 and Lemma 4, and conclude with our two main theorems about the product extractor that are derived by setting \( t \). The main results in this section follow immediately from the following general adaptivity lemma, which shows that any LRE against non-adaptive BCPs actually works against adaptive BCPs as well - at the expense of some loss in the error.
Lemma 5. Let $\text{Ext} : (\{0, 1\}^n)^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^m$ be a leakage-
resilient extractor against $n$BCP$(p, \mu)$ for entropy $k$, with
error $\epsilon$. Then $\text{Ext}$ is also a leakage-resilient extractor against
BCP$(p, \mu)$ for entropy $k$ with error at most $(2^n + 1)\sqrt{\epsilon}$.

The proof of this lemma works, in some sense, by approximation adaptive BCPs by non-adaptive BCPs. It can be found in the full version of the paper.

Finally, we note that by applying Lemma 5 to Lemma 2 and setting $t = \frac{\log(n)}{\log(N/p)+1}$, we immediately obtain Theorem 1. By applying Lemma 5 to Lemma 4 and setting $t = \frac{\log(N-1)}{\log(\epsilon^{(1)}(1))}$, we immediately obtain Theorem 2.

V. AN EXPLICIT LRE AGAINST NOFS

In this section, we show that the function $\text{BouExt} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \rightarrow \{0, 1\}^{10}$ defined by

$$\text{BouExt}(x_1, \ldots, x_n) = \text{sign} \sin \left( \frac{2\pi \prod_{i \in [n]} x_i}{q} \right)$$

is an explicit LRE against number on forehead protocols.

We follow the approach of the seminal work of Babai, Nisan, and Szegedy [17] who proved lower bounds for number-on-forehead (NOF) protocols. We begin by recalling definitions from [17] (see full version for generalized definitions).

Definition 10. ((17) (s-component of Protocol $\Pi$) Let

$\Pi$ be a multiparty protocol on $N$ parties and $s$ be any transcript. The $s$-component, $X_{\Pi,s}$ is defined to be the set of $N$-tuples $x \in \mathbb{F}_q^N$ such that on input $x$ the protocol $\Pi$ results in exactly $s$ being written on the board.

Definition 11. (Cylinder and Cylinder Intersection) A

subset $Y$ of $N$-tuples in called a cylinder for dimension

$i \in [N]$ if membership in $Y$ does not depend on coordinate $i$. A subset $Y$ of $N$-tuples in called a cylinder-intersection if $Y$ is an intersection of cylinders.

Definition 12. (Discrepancy) Let $f : \mathbb{F}_q^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ be a boolean function. The discrepancy of $f$ is, $\Gamma(f)$, is defined as

$$\max_Y \left| Pr[f(x) = 1 \text{ & } x \in Y] - Pr[f(x) = 0 \text{ & } x \in Y]\right|$$

where $Y$ ranges over cylinder-intersections and $x$ is chosen uniformly over $\mathbb{F}_q^N$.

Lemma 6. [17] For any $N$-party NOF protocol $\Pi$ and transcript $s$, the $s$-component $X_{\Pi,s}$ is a cylinder-intersection.

As our extractor is based on exponential sums, we recall them next.

10We can use standard XOR lemmas to output multiple bits [52].

A. Exponential Sums

Let $\mathbb{F}_q$ be a prime field of cardinality $q$. Let $e_q(x) = \exp(2ix\pi/q)$. Building up on the exponential sums of [55], [56], Petridis and Shparlinski [57] defined the following class of exponential functions $^{11}$

Definition 13. (Multi-linear Exponential sums) [57] For

any $K$ and $N$, multi-linear exponential sum, $\text{SUM}_N$, is defined as follows:

$$\text{SUM}_N(K) = \max \left| \sum_{x_1 \in X_1} \cdots \sum_{x_n \in X_n} \phi(x) e_q \left( \eta \prod_{i \in [n]} x_i \right) \right|$$

where the maximum is over all subsets $X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N) \subseteq \mathbb{F}_q^N$ with $|X_i| \leq K$ for all $i \in [N]$, all $\eta \in \mathbb{F}_q^n$, and cylinder-intersections $\phi : \mathbb{F}_q^N \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. Here and throughout, $\phi(x) = \phi_1(x) \cdots \phi_N(x)$, where $\phi_i$ does not depend on $x_i$ for each $i \in [N]$.

Extending Petridis and Shparlinski [57], Kerr and Macourt [58] obtained bounds on $\text{SUM}_N$ for any $N \ll \log \log q$. We state the most suitable bounds of Petridis and Shparlinski [57] and Kerr and Macourt [58] that we will use $^{12}$ for small constants (3,4,6). In our notation, their results translate to:

Theorem 6. For some constant $C > 0$,

- [57]: $\text{SUM}_3(K) \leq Cq^{1/8}K^{43/16}$ and $\text{SUM}_4(K) \leq Cq^{1/16}K^{61/16}$,
- [58]: $\text{SUM}_3(K) \leq Cq^{1/64}K^{3045/512+o(1)}$

In particular, we can get that for all $N > 5$,

$$\text{SUM}_N(q^{0.3}) \leq \frac{q^{0.3N}}{q^{\Omega(1)/2N}}$$

Finally, we recall an observation from Bourgain [22, Remark 3.3], see also [67], which can be used to obtain upper bounds on sums using BouExt in terms of upper bounds on exponential sums.

Lemma 7. [22] Let $x$ denote $(x_1, \ldots, x_N) \in (\mathbb{F}_q)^N$. For any function $\phi$ that takes $x$ as input, we have,

$$\left| \sum_{x_1 \in X_1} \cdots \sum_{x_N \in X_N} \phi(x)(-1)^{\text{BouExt}(x)} \right| \leq$$

$$\left( C \log q \right)^{\max_{\eta \in \mathbb{F}_q^N}} \left| \sum_{x_1 \in X_1} \cdots \sum_{x_N \in X_N} \phi(x) e_q \left( \eta \prod_{i \in [N]} x_i \right) \right|$$

for some universal constant $C$.

$^{11}$ [57] define `weight functions' to denote cylinder-intersections. Being more general, they could output any complex number with absolute value at most 1

$^{12}$This will help us get the best min-entropy rate later.
B. Extractor

We are now in position to prove Theorem 3. A technicality is that while Theorem 3 was stated with inputs to each party being elements of \( \{0, 1\}^n \), we will on the other hand work with inputs to each party being elements of \( \mathbb{F}_q \) for prime \( q \approx 2^n \). We assume that we have access to such a prime\(^{13}\).

**Theorem 7.** Fix a sufficiently large prime \( q \). Let \( n = \log q \), and \( \text{BouExt} : \mathbb{F}_q^n \to \{0, 1\} \) be as defined above. Then for all \( N > 5 \), \( \text{BouExt} \) is an \((N - 1, N, \mu)\)-cylinder intersection extractor with error \( \epsilon \) for all \((n, 0.3n)\)-sources with \( \mu = \Omega(n)/2^N \) and \( \epsilon = 2^{-\Omega(n)/2^N} \).

**Proof:** We begin with the observation of Chor and Goldreich [21], that any source \( X_i \) distributed on \( \mathbb{F}_q \) with min-entropy rate \( \delta := 0.3 \) is a convex combination of uniform sources on \( q^\delta \) sized subsets \( X_i \subseteq \mathbb{F}_q \). Therefore, we only need to focus on \( q^\delta \) sized subsets. Fix any \( X = \otimes_i X_i \subseteq (\mathbb{F}_q)^N \) such that \( |X_i| = q^\delta \) for each \( i \in [N] \).

Fix any number-on-forehead protocol \( \Pi \) with at most \( \mu \) bits of communication. Let \( \Gamma \) be the set of transcripts that can be produced by executing \( \Pi \) on some \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_N) \in X \). Recall the notion of a \( \tau \)-component from Definition 10: \( X_{\Gamma, \tau} \) denotes the set of \( x \in X \) that result in transcript \( \tau \) when protocol \( \Gamma \) is executed on \( x \).

Moreover, by Lemma 6, for each transcript \( \tau \), \( \tau \)-component \( X_{\Gamma, \tau} \) is a cylinder-intersection. Denote it by \( \phi^\tau \).

To show that \( \text{BouExt} \) is a \((N - 1, N, \mu)\)-cylinder intersection extractor with error \( \epsilon \), it suffices to upper bound the following

\[
|\langle \text{BouExt}(X), \Pi(X) \rangle - (U_1, \Pi(X))|
\]

where \( X = (X_1, \ldots, X_N) \), and each \( X_i \) is uniformly distributed over some subset size \( q^\delta \). By definition of statistical distance, this is equal to,

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{b \in \{0, 1\}} \sum_{\tau \in \Gamma} \left| \Pr_{X} [\Pi(X) = \tau \text{ and } \text{BouExt}(X) = b] - \Pr_{X} [\Pi(X) = \tau \text{ and } U_1 = b] \right|
\]

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\tau \in \Gamma} \left| \Pr_{X} [\Pi(X) = \tau] \Pr_{X} [\text{BouExt}(X) = 1 | \Pi(X) = \tau] \right|
\]

\[
- \Pr_{X} [\text{BouExt}(X) = 0 | \Pi(X) = \tau]
\]

Next, note that the condition \( \Pi(X) = \tau \) is equivalent to \( X \) being in \( \tau \)-component, which in turn, is equivalent to \( X \) being in the corresponding cylinder-intersection \( \phi^\tau \). Substituting we get,

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\tau \in \Gamma} \Pr_{X} [\Pi(X) = \tau] \left| \Pr_{X} [\text{BouExt}(X) = 1 | \Pi(X) = \tau] \right|
\]

Computing the conditional probability, we get, where \( x = (x_1, \ldots, x_N) \),

\[
\Pr_{X} [\Pi(X) = \tau] = \frac{1}{|X_{\Gamma, \tau}|}
\]

\[
\sum_{x_1 \in X_1} \cdots \sum_{x_N \in X_N} \phi(X)(-1)^{\text{BouExt}(x)}
\]

Moreover, as we have uniform distribution over \( X \), \( \Pr_{X} [\Pi(X) = \tau] \) is equal to \(|X_{\Gamma, \tau}|/|X|\). Plugging this, the above simplifies to,

\[
= \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\tau \in \Gamma} \frac{1}{|X|} \left| \sum_{x_1 \in X_1} \cdots \sum_{x_N \in X_N} \phi(X)(-1)^{\text{BouExt}(x)} \right|
\]

We can then use the connection to exponential sums (Lemma 7) to obtain the following bound on the above quantity:

\[
\leq \frac{1}{2} \sum_{\tau \in \Gamma} \left( \frac{C \log q \text{SUM}_N(q^\delta)}{|X|} \right)
\]

As there can be at most \( 2^\mu \) transcripts in \( \Gamma \), we get

\[
\leq \frac{(C \log q) \cdot 2^\mu \cdot \text{SUM}_N(q^\delta)}{|X|}
\]

As \( |X| = q^{\delta N} \), using theorem 6, we get for \( N \geq 6 \),

\[
|\langle \text{BouExt}(X), \Pi(X) \rangle - (U_1, \Pi(X))| \leq C \cdot 2^\mu \cdot q^{-\Omega(1)/2^N}.
\]

Substituting sufficiently small \( \mu = q^{\Omega(1)/2^N} \) proves our theorem.

\[\blacksquare\]

VI. ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Eshan Chattopadhyay and Jesse Goodman are supported by NSF grant CCF-1849899. Vipul Goyal is supported in part by NSF grant 1916939, a gift from Ripple, a JP Morgan Faculty Fellowship, and a Cylab seed funding award. Ashutosh Kumar is supported by NSF grants CCF-1553605 and 1619348, DARPA under Cooperative Agreement No: HR0011-20-2-0025, US-Israel BSF grant 2012366. Xin Li is supported by NSF Award CCF-1617713 and NSF CAREER Award CCF-1845349. Raghu Meka is supported by NSF Grant CCF-1553605. David Zuckerman is supported by NSF Grant CCF-1705028 and a Simons Investigator Award (#409864).

\(^{13}\)We could potentially avoid this technicality by assuming Cramer’s conjecture on primes or using part of the input to generate the prime at random (we only need average-case lower bounds). We do not delve into this issue here.
REFERENCES


